Walking the Thin Line in \u3ci\u3eOtey v. Stenberg\u3c/i\u3e, 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994): Did the Attorney General\u27s Dual Role of Arbiter and Prosecutor Shock the Conscience? by Carson, Sheree Strom
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 73 | Issue 2 Article 9
1994
Walking the Thin Line in Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d
635 (8th Cir. 1994): Did the Attorney General's
Dual Role of Arbiter and Prosecutor Shock the
Conscience?
Sheree Strom Carson
University of Nebraska College of Law, scarson@perkinscoie.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Sheree Strom Carson, Walking the Thin Line in Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994): Did the Attorney General's Dual Role of
Arbiter and Prosecutor Shock the Conscience?, 73 Neb. L. Rev. (1994)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol73/iss2/9
Note
Walking the Thin Line in Otey v.
Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir.
1994): Did the Attorney General's
Dual Role of Arbiter and
Prosecutor Shock the Conscience?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ........................................... 484
II. Background ................................... 486
A. Historical Overview of Clemency ................... 486
B. Previous Due Process Challenges Brought by
Prisoners .......................................... 488
1. United States Supreme Court Cases ............. 488
2. Due Process Challenges to Clemency
Proceedings ..................................... 489
3. Substantive Due Process Analysis ............... 493
III. Analysis ............................................... 494
A. Majority Opinion ................................... 494
B. Dissenting Opinion ................................. 495
C. A Regulatory View of Substantive Due Process ...... 496
D. Dual Role of Prosecutor and Arbiter ................ 498
1. Attorney General's Conduct ..................... 498
a. Unprecedented Involvement of Attorney
General's Staff at the Board of Pardons
Hearing ..................................... 499
b. Attorney General's Involvement with His
Staff's Opposition to Otey's Application for
Commutation ................................ 500
c. Attorney General's Vigorous Prosecution of the
Death Sentence for Otey ..................... 501
2. Case Law Addressing Dual Role of Prosecutor
and Judge ...................................... 502
3. Ethics and Professional Responsibility Opinions . 507
IV. Conclusion ............................................. 510
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 2, 1994 the State of Nebraska carried out its first
execution in more than thirty-five years.' Harold Lamont Otey, con-
victed of first degree murder in 1978, died in the electric chair after
exhausting his appeals to the state and federal courts.
In the four years prior to his execution, Otey filed two constitu-
tional challenges which not only delayed his execution, but also raised
questions about the Nebraska clemency process. In Otey v. Hopkins2
and again in Otey v. Stenberg,3 Otey challenged the Nebraska Board
of Pardons hearing in which his plea for a commutation of his death
sentence to life imprisonment was rejected. Specifically, Otey claimed
that the dual role of the Nebraska Attorney General, serving as
prosecutor of his death sentence and arbiter on the three-member Par-
dons Board, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4
The majority rejected Otey's due process challenge in both the ini-
tial habeas corpus appeal,5 and the subsequent civil rights claim.6
The majority focused on the unfettered discretion granted to the board
by Nebraska's clemency statutes and determined that the statute cre-
ated no "constitutional right or entitlement sufficient to invoke the
due process clause."7
The dissent argued that Otey's claim should be upheld as a viola-
tion of substantive due process.8 Unlike previous claimants who have
argued that procedural due process should attach to clemency hear-
1. Bob Reeves & Marc Krasnowsky, Otey Executed, LINCOLN STAR, Sept. 2, 1994, at
1.
2. 5 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1993). Otey v. Hopkins was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Two judges on the
three judge panel ruled that a writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriate
vehicle for Otey's claim that his hearing before the Nebraska Board of Pardons
violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Although the court dismissed the claim on
jurisdictional grounds, the majority advised that even if Otey's claims were prop-
erly before the court in a civil rights action, the court would affirm the district
court's denial of the claim. Id. at 1131-32.
3. 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994). Otey v. Stenberg, brought as a civil rights claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), alleged violations of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment against Otey. Id. at 639.
4. Id. at 635. This Note does not address Otey's Equal Protection challenge to the
Pardons Board proceeding.
5. Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125, 1131 (8th Cir. 1993).
6. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994).
7. Id. at 637 (quoting Whitmore v. Gaines, 24 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 1994)).
8. Id. at 639-40 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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ings,9 the dissent urged that the presence of the Attorney General at
the hearing, acting in the dual role of arbiter and prosecutor, violated
notions of fundamental fairness..1o
This Note will explore the dissent's opinion that the Attorney Gen-
eral's conduct, in acting as both decisionmaker and prosecutor at the
Board of Pardons hearing, was outside the acceptable realm of govern-
ment activity and was so unfair as to constitute a substantive due pro-
cess violation. First, this Note will briefly summarize the history of
the pardons process. This historical overview will demonstrate that
the power to grant clemency is historically an executive power which
is discretionary in nature. Second, this Note will review a line of cases
in which prisoners raised due process claims including, most recently,
cases addressing the clemency process. The Note will distinguish be-
tween this line of largely procedural due process cases and Otey's sub-
stantive due process claim. Third, this Note will contrast the two
distinct views of substantive due process voiced by the majority and
the dissent. Finally, this Note will analyze the Attorney General's
role in the Pardons Board hearing and measure it according to stan-
dards of fairness and acceptable government behavior as set forth in
case law, and according to the historical ethical standards for attor-
neys and judges espoused by the American Bar Association.
This Note will conclude that the vesting of the Pardons Board deci-
sionmaking power in the Attorney General, as one of three executive
officers, creates an opportunity for abuse of power. The opportunity
for abuse was seized upon in Otey's Board of Pardons hearing, when
the Attorney General transformed the informal hearing into an adver-
sarial proceeding and assumed the role of prosecutor as well as arbi-
ter. Such exploitation of a governmental position-when the price at
stake is a human life-shocks society's notions of fundamental fair-
ness and thus violates substantive due process.
9. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Bundy v. Dugger,
850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989); Smith v. Snow,
722 F.2d 630 (11th Cir. 1983); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
10. It is unreasonable to assume that the attorney general would freely con-
sider the same sentence inappropriate at a clemency hearing, especially
when his own representatives are arguing before him in favor of retain-
ing the sentence. With the attorney general's position fixed, a petitioner
must obtain the vote of the other two members of the panel. Otey re-
ceived one favorable vote, but not both. The State has created a playing
field that is tilted toward denial and is therefore fundamentally unfair.
Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 640-41 (8th Cir. 1994)(Gibson, J., dissenting).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of Clemency
Throughout history, clemency has been an issue of power"A and a
method of tempering a harsh or limited judicial system.12 The par-
doning power may have originated with the Teutonic tribes,13 but was
firmly established in the Anglo-Saxon period.14 Prior to 1535 when
Henry VIII was able to vest all pardoning power in the monarch,' 5 a
number of groups competed for the power to pardon, including the
church, the earls and the feudal court.' 6 The king retained the nearly
absolute power to pardon until Parliament began exerting control and
implementing limitations over the king's prerogative through the en-
actment of a series of laws which ultimately resulted in Parliament
also obtaining the power to pardon in 1721.17
The colonists modeled the federal clemency power after the British
and vested the pardoning authority solely in the executive branch.18
In United States v. Wilson,19 Chief Justice Marshall defined the par-
don power as "an act of grace," which is a "private, though official act
of the executive magistrate," and "a constituent part of the judicial
system."20 More recently, the Court modified its view of the pardon-
ing power. According to Justice Holmes,
[a] pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happen-
ing to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted
11. Stanley Grupp, Historical Aspects of the Pardon in England, 7 Am. J. LEGAL Hisr.
51, 53 (1963)("It would appear... that the exercise of the pardon prerogative has
always been in a real sense a question of power."); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of
Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEx. L. Rxv.
569, 586 (1991Xobserving that "the king's use of the clemency power... was not
an end in itself; [rather, the purpose . . . was to consolidate the monarch's
power.").
12. A.T.H. Smith, The Prerogative of Mercy, The Power of Pardon and Criminal Jus-
tice, 1983 Pun. L. 398, 439.
13. Grupp, supra note 11 at 52.
14. Id. at 53.
15. Kobil, supra note 11, at 586; Grupp, supra note 11 at 55.
16. Grupp, supra note 11, at 55.
17. See Kobil, supra note 11, at 587-88.
18. Id. at 590-92.
19. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
20. Id. at 160-61. Chief Justice Marshall further noted that the pardoning power in
the United States was closely modeled after the English system.
As [the pardoning] power has been exercised from time immemorial
by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to
whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their
principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into
their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used
by the person who would avail himself of it.
Id. at 160.
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it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be
better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.2 1
The states were more skeptical of the executive powers and ini-
tially tended to place the pardon power with the legislature, although
over time the majority of states have aligned themselves with the fed-
eral system and have entrusted the pardoning power, either in whole
or in part, with the executive branch.22 Although Nebraska initially
placed the pardoning power with the Governor, in 1920, the power
was transferred to the Board of Pardons, which consisted of three ex-
ecutive officers-the Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of
State.2 3 Additionally, statutes passed in 1969 provided that all prop-
erly filed clemency requests be considered, that a hearing may be held,
and if held, a complete record of the proceedings be made and pre-
served.24 Additionally, state law requires that an execution be stayed
while the application for clemency is pending.25 Thus, Nebraska has
slightly altered the historical notion of vesting the pardons power
solely with the chief executive officer, though the power remains with
a three-person executive board.
21. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
22. Kobil, supra note 11, at 604-05. According to Kobil, in 1991,
[t]wenty-nine states place the clemency power in the governor alone,
although most of those states have established an advisory body that
makes nonbinding recommendations to the chief executive. In sixteen
states, the governor shares the power to make clemency decisions with
an administrative board or panel. In the five remaining states, an ad-
ministrative panel, usually appointed by the governor, has the principal
authority to make clemency decisions.
Id. at 605.
23. NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13 states as follows:
The Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of State, sitting as a
board, shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures and to grant
respites, reprieves pardons, or commutations in all cases of conviction
for offenses against -the laws of the state, except treason and cases of
impeachment.
24. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,129(2)(Reissue 1987) states:
The [pardons] application shall be considered with or without a hearing
by the board at its next regular meeting or within thirty days, whichever
is earlier. If a hearing is held, it shall be conducted in an informal man-
ner, but a complete record of the proceedings shall be made and
preserved.
25. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,132 (Reissue 1987) states:
Whenever an application for exercise of the pardon authority is filed
with the secretary of the Board of Pardons by a committed offender who
is under a sentence of death, the sentence shall not be carried out until
the board rules upon such application. If the board denies the relief re-
quested it may set the time and date of execution and refuse to accept for
filing further applications from such offender.
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B. Previous Due Process Challenges Brought by Prisoners
1. United States Supreme Court Cases
The United States Supreme Court has addressed a number of due
process claims by prisoners. In most of the cases, the prisoners al-
leged procedural due process violations. In reviewing these claims,
the Court first sought to determine whether the prisoner had a liberty
interest to which procedural due process protections could attach. Ini-
tially, the Court focused on state law to determine if the language of
statutes or state rules created a liberty interest for the prisoners as-
serting the claims.
In Wolff v. McDonnell,26 the Court held that prison disciplinary
proceedings which deprived inmates of their good-time credit without
due process of law violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
recognized that Nebraska law, which allowed for good-time credit for
prisoners, created a liberty interest to which due process attached.
The Court noted that the state of Nebraska had established a right to
a shortened sentence through the accumulation of credits for good be-
havior.27 Thus, a hearing was required before the state could deprive
inmates of their accumulated credits. Because "prisoners in Nebraska
can only lose good-time credits if they are guilty of serious misconduct,
the determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes
critical, and the minimum requirements of procedural due process ...
must be observed."28
In contrast, in Meachum v. Fano,29 the Court recognized that
although a conviction does not deprive a prisoner of all his or her con-
stitutional rights, it does extinguish the defendant's liberty interest
sufficiently so as not to require the prison administration to hold a
transfer hearing prior to moving a prisoner from one facility to an-
other.30 In determining whether a liberty interest existed, the Court
noted that it is the nature of the interest, rather than the weight, that
determines whether procedural due process attaches.31 The Court de-
termined that state law did not create a liberty interest in terms of a
26. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
27. Id. at 557.
28. Id. at 558. The Court held that the following procedures were required: (1) writ-
ten notice of the charges must be provided to the prisoner at least twenty-four
hours prior to the hearing;, (2) a written statement by the factfinders as to the
reasons for the disciplinary action taken must be provided to the prisoner; (3) a
written record of the proceedings should be maintained; and (4) the inmate
should be allowed to call witnesses and present evidence. Id. at 564-66.
29. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
30. Id. at 224-25.
31. Id. at 224 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
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prisoner's right to remain in a specific prison. Thus, there was no in-
terest to which procedural rights could attach.
3 2
In contrast to the foregoing cases, the United States Supreme
Court looked beyond state law and conducted a substantive due pro-
cess analysis in Vitek v. Jones.33 In Vitek, the Court determined that
although a prisoner has no liberty interest in remaining in a specific
prison facility, an involuntary transfer to a mental hospital implicates
a liberty interest which requires procedural due process protections.
3 4
In that case, the Court recognized that the liberty interest was rooted
in state law,3 5 which set forth specific criteria which were to be pres-
ent before an inmate was transferred, as well as in the Constitution
itself.3 6 Additionally, the Court looked to those "historic liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause"3 7 and concluded that the prisoner
"retained a residuum of liberty" that entitled him to the "benefit of
procedures appropriate in the circumstances before he is found to
have a mental disease and transferred to a mental hospital."3 8
2. Due Process Challenges to Clemency Proceedings
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of whether the
Due Process Clause attaches to clemency proceedings in Connecticut
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat.39 In Dumschat, an inmate serving a
sentence of life-imprisonment brought a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board of Par-
dons' failure to provide him with a written statement of the reasons
for denying his request for commutation of his sentence violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.40 Again, the Court looked to state law to de-
32. Id. at 228. The Court cited the discretionary nature of the transfer system in
holding that no liberty interest was present.
Whatever expectation the prisoner may have in remaining at a particu-
lar prison so long as he behaves himself, it is too ephemeral and insub-
stantial to trigger procedural due process protections as long as prison
officials have discretion to transfer him for whatever reason or for no
reason at all.
Id.
33. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
34. Id. at 495-96.
35. Id. at 488-90. The Court distinguished the liberty interest created by state law in
Vitek from Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1980). In Meachum, no liberty inter-
est was found, because the function of transferring prisoners to other facilities
was discretionary with the prison administration, whereas in Vitek, state law re-
quired specific criteria to be present before an inmate could be transferred to a
mental health facility. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980).
36. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980).
37. Id..
38. Id. at 491, 493.
39. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
40. Id. at 461.
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termine whether a liberty interest existed.41 The Court noted the ab-
sence of standards for granting a commutation of life sentence and
determined that the Board of Pardons had "unfettered discretion" in
making clemency determinations.42 Because the decision to grant
clemency was totally discretionary in nature, the Court held that the
"power vested in the Connecticut Board of Pardons to commute
sentences conferred no rights on respondents beyond the right to seek
commutation."43 The Court rejected Dumschat's argument that be-
cause the Board had granted three-fourths of the applications for com-
mutation of life sentences, a liberty interest or entitlement was
created for life-term inmates, and thus the board was required to ex-
plain its reasons for denial of a request for commutation.44 Because
there was no liberty interest in clemency, neither was there a proce-
dural due process violation, for a protected interest was a necessary
prerequisite to a finding of a due process violation.
Three prisoners have brought due process challenges to the state
clemency process, and all have been rejected by the federal appellate
courts. In Spinkellink v. Wainwright,45 the court entertained a chal-
lenge to the Florida clemency procedure which was very similar to the
challenge raised by Otey. Specifically, Spinkellink claimed that the
inclusion of the attorney general in the clemency process denied the
prisoner an impartial tribunal and thus was fundamentally unfair.4 6
The court held that the Due Process Clause did not apply to clemency
decisions by the governor and cabinet and thus never reached the sec-
ond issue of whether the clemency rules complied with procedural due
process standards.47 The court based this holding on two factors.
First, the clemency decision by the governor and cabinet failed to im-
plicate any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The
court relied heavily on Meachum's state law analysis in reaching this
conclusion. Second, the court looked beyond state law to the history of
the pardoning power. The court relied on the historical notion that
41. "The ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must be found in statutes or other
rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with exercising clemency."
Id. at 465.
42. Id. at 466.
43. Id. at 467.
44. Id. at 467. "[Tlhe mere existence of a power to commute a lawfully imposed sen-
tence, and the granting of commutations to many petitioners, create no right or
'entitlement.' A state cannot be required to explain its reasons for a decision
when it is not required to act on prescribed grounds." Id.
45. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
46. Id. at 617. Spinkellink also brought a procedural due process challenge. Specifi-
cally, he claimed he was denied the privilege of personally attending the hearing,
denied disclosure of evidence relied upon by the Commission in reaching an ad-
verse recommendation, and did not receive notice df the standards used by the
Commission in reaching its decision. Id.
47. Id. at 617-19.
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the substantive discretion of the executive in the exercise of clemency
power is "all but absolute" 48 and thus it would threaten separation of
powers to allow courts to monitor discretionary decisions of the execu-
tive branch which "are not the business of judges."49
Interestingly, in Spinkellink, the court relied on Schick v. ReedO to
support its holding. In Schick, the Court held that the federal pardon-
ing power "flows from the Constitution alone... and that it cannot be
modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress."51 However, in
Schick, the Court went on to say that the power should be interpreted
"so as to permit the attachment of any condition which does not other-
wise offend the Constitution,"52 and further stated that the president
had "plenary authority... to 'forgive' the convicted person" within any
means "which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable."53
Thus, although Schick recognizes the nearly absolute and discretion-
ary power of the executive in dispensing pardons, the case also recog-
nizes the outside boundaries placed on the executive's pardoning
power-that it cannot be dispensed in a constitutionally objectionable
manner.
In Smith v. Snow,5 4 the court refused to grant an injunction to stay
an execution based on a prisoner's claim that the unfettered discretion
of the Georgia pardons board allowed for arbitrary and capricious ap-
plication of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments.55 Following Dumschat, the court looked to the
discretionary nature of the Georgia State Board of Pardons' clemency
procedure and determined the state law created no liberty interest to
which procedural due process could attach. After deciding the Four-
teenth Amendment challenge, the court likewise rejected the Eighth
Amendment claim, stating that "[i]f one has no right to procedures,
the purpose of which is to prevent arbitrariness and curb discretion,
then one clearly has no right to challenge the fact that the decision is
discretionary."56
In Bundy v. Dugger,57 another due process challenge to Florida's
clemency procedure, the court began its due process analysis by deter-
mining whether the prisoner had a recognizable liberty interest to
48. Id. at 618.
49. Id. at 619.
50. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
51. Id. at 266.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 722 F.2d 630 (11th Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 631-32.
56. Id. at 632.
57. 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988).
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which due process could attach.58 The court recognized a liberty in-
terest may arise from state statute or from the Due Process Clause
itself. However, the court, relying on Spinkellink, quickly dismissed
the notion that a liberty interest in clemency could arise from the con-
stitution. Likewise, the court rejected the claim that state law created
a liberty interest, because the clemency procedures were not
mandatory and were not governed by "specific substantive predi-
cates."59 Because there was no protected liberty interest, either under
state law or the Constitution, the court held that procedural due pro-
cess was not triggered and the Governor was not required to make
factual findings in order to deny clemency.60
In contrast to these federal court cases, in McGee v. Arizona State
Board of Pardons,61 the Arizona Supreme Court held that procedural
due process was violated when the Board of Pardons failed to hold a
"substantial" hearing to consider a prisoner's request for commutation
of his death sentence. 62 Although no state statutes or department
rules required the board to hold a hearing, the state court concluded
that notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a "hearing in a substan-
tial sense" should be held.63 The court noted that:
[ilt is not merely the individual with whom we are here concerned. It is that
this person has not received his full measure in the struggle against the pub-
lic's will. The unlawful taking of a human life has from time immemorial been
considered immoral. It is not less so because it is done collectively by the
state. If it is to be justified under the law, it must not be done with less for-
mality than the spirit and the traditions of the law contemplate.64
In the foregoing cases, before the courts could decide the proce-
dural due process issue, the courts first were required to determine if
the prisoner had a protected interest to which procedural due process
could attach. In the majority of the cases, the courts looked to state
law to determine if statutes or rules created such an interest. When
the state procedure that was challenged involved a function which
was purely discretionary-such as the transfer of prisoners from one
facility to another in Meachum, or the granting of clemency in Dum-
schatt, Spinkellink, Smith, and Bundy-the courts refused to hold
that state law created a liberty interest to which procedural due pro-
cess requirements would attach.
58. "We begin our analysis of the procedural due process claim by determining
whether Bundy has a protected liberty interest in being accorded a hearing for
executive clemency." Id. at 1423.
59. Id. at 1424.
60. Id.
61. 376 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1962).
62. Id. at 781.
63. Id. (quoting Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 23 (1937)).
64. Id.
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3. Substantive Due Process Analysis
In a few cases, the courts looked beyond state law to determine if a
liberty interest existed on which the prisoner's procedural due process
challenge could be hung. In Spinkellink, the court conducted a nar-
rowly framed substantive due process analysis in which the court in-
quired whether historically a prisoner has the right to challenge an
executive clemency decision.65 Although the challenge to the Florida
clemency process included allegations that the process was fundamen-
tally unfair because the Attorney General participated in the decision-
making process, the court sidestepped the issue of whether the
clemency process was exercised in a constitutionally acceptable man-
ner. Instead, the court focused on the executive's nearly absolute and
discretionary pardoning power, which the court found to be off-limits
to the judiciary under the separation of powers principle. However, as
previously noted, the court relied upon Schick v. Reed66 which re-
quires that the executive's pardoning power be exercised within "con-
stitutionally acceptable means." Hence, the court avoided the real
issue: whether the inclusion of the Attorney General in the clemency
process violates historical notions of fundamental fairness and thus is
outside the realm of constitutionally acceptable behavior in the clem-
ency process.
Vitek provides the best example of a substantive due process analy-
sis. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that an involuntary
transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital implicated a liberty interest
rooted in the Constitution, as well as state law.67 According to the
Court, "[t]he loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is
more than a loss of freedom from confinement .... 'Among the historic
liberties' protected by the Due Process Clause is the 'right to be free
from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on per-
sonal security.'"68 Thus, the Court recognized that even though a
prisoner loses many of his liberties when incarcerated, this freedom
from intrusions on personal security remained intact.
Although Otey's challenge to the Nebraska clemency process is
similar to the challenge set forth in Spinkellink, the appropriate anal-
ysis of Otey's substantive due process claim is the analysis under-
taken by the Supreme Court in Vitek. Accordingly, to fairly analyze
Otey's claim, the court should have determined whether a prosecutor
who sits as judge violates historical notions of fundamental fairness
and, therefore, implicates a liberty interest to which due process pro-
tections should attach. Put another way, is the traditional and histor-
65. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582,618-19 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 937 (1979).
66. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
67. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980).
68. Id. at 492 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
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ical notion that one individual cannot act as both prosecutor and judge
so seared into this nation's ideals of fundamental fairness that even a
convicted murderer on death row has the right to be free from this
type of aversive governmental conduct.69
No court has confronted head-on the argument, as set forth in the
dissent, that the manner in which pardons are dispensed can violate
substantive due process because the very nature of the governmental
activity offends notions of fundamental fairness. This Note will not
address Otey's procedural due process claims.70 Rather, this Note will
focus on the issue of substantive due process as raised in the dissent-
ing opinion of Otey v. Stenberg.71 Under such a view, it is the govern-
mental activity that must be examined. The issue then becomes
whether the governmental activity itself-in this case the Attorney
General acting in the dual role of judge and prosecutor at the Pardons
Board hearing-shocks traditional societal notions of fundamental
fairness and thus violates substantive due process.
III. ANALYSIS
Despite his conviction, Otey retained a liberty interest in the right
to be free from arbitrary government activity in which his prosecutor
also functioned as his judge. Although history supports the execu-
tive's discretionary power to grant pardons,72 Nebraska's scheme for
executive pardon in which the Attorney General acts as both prosecu-
tor and judge is alien to this society's notion of acceptable governmen-
tal activity.
A. Majority Opinion
The majority refused to recognize a distinction between Otey's
claim and the procedural due process claim brought by the inmates in
Dumschat.73 The court cited dicta in the Nebraska Supreme Court's
opinion in Otey v. State74 in which the court characterized the pardons
power as one of unfettered discretion to which no liberty interest could
69. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) ("[W]e have insisted not
merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental'... but also
that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society.").
70. For an argument that the creation of pardons boards, the holding of hearings,
and the setting forth of minimum procedural requirements for the Pardons Board
to follow create an expectations that fair procedures will be followed, see Daniel
T. Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty and the Pur-
suit of Clemency, 27 U. RicH. L. REv. 201, 224-25 (1993).
71. 34 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1994).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 11-25.
73. "Due Process never attached to the Nebraska clemency proceedings. Otey's dis-
tinction between Dumschat and his own case is a distinction without a differ-
ence." Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1994).
74. 240 Neb. 813, 485 N.W.2d 153 (1992).
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attach.75 Thus, the court looked to state law and determined it cre-
ated no liberty interest.76 The majority refused to address the essence
of Otey's substantive due process claim, stating "we have yet to decide
whether substantive due process provides a right to be free from arbi-
trary and capricious state action."77
B. Dissenting Opinion
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent concluded that the
Nebraska clemency procedure "has created a playing field that is
tilted toward denial" and is therefore fundamentally unfair. 78 The
dissent saw a "theoretical divide between Dumschat's reliance on pro-
cedural due process and Otey's plea for substantive due process." 79
While Dumschat's procedural due process claim was based on the no-
tion that the Board of Pardons had created a liberty interest in clem-
ency by granting seventy-five percent of all requests for commutation
of life sentences,80 Otey's substantive due process claim focused on the
fundamentally unfair actions of the state by including the Attorney
General on the Board of Pardons.
Dumschat's claim of an expectation of pardon was far different from Otey's
substantive due process claim that the clemency procedures are fundamen-
tally unfair in including the state's chief prosecuting officer as a member of
the Board of Pardons. Otey's claim focuses not on a right to receive a pardon,
but on a right to seek it before an unprejudiced [bloard.
Substantive due process protects individuals from government conduct
that "shocks the conscience." The idea of a prisoner pleading for his life before
a board that includes the very official responsible for his prosecution and con-
viction is shocking to the judicial conscience.8 1
The dissent noted the evolution of Nebraska's clemency process
from one which vested total discretionary power in the governor, to
the current process which authorized proceedings by a board and the
opportunity for a hearing.8 2 This metamorphosis in the nature of
75. "[The Nebraska Board of Pardons has the unfettered discretion to grant or deny
a commutation of a lawfully imposed sentence for any reason or for no reason at
all." Id. at 830, 485 N.W.2d at 166.
76. Like the clemency statute at issue in Dumschat, the Nebraska clemency
statute also is standardless. Otey had no state-created right other than
the right to ask for mercy. As in Dumschat, this does not create a pro-
tectable interest in clemency. It also does not create a protectable inter-
est in the manner in which the Board receives his request or in having
unbiased decisionmakers on the Board.
Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1994).
77. Id. (quoting Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1993)).
78. Id. at 641 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 639.
80. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 461 (1981).
81. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1994)(Gibson, J., dissenting)(citing
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
82. Id.
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clemency, combined with the United States Supreme Court's recent
declaration in Herrera v. Collins8 3 that the clemency process was a
"fail safe" against executing innocent people and thus an integral part
of the capital punishment laws, signalled to the dissent that such an
important and necessary procedure84 could not be conducted in a fun-
damentally unfair manner.
Given the crucial role of clemency in the states' capital punishment laws, I
believe it violates substantive due process to entrust the pardoning power,
even in part, to the state's chief prosecutor .... Executions, like convictions,
"cannot be brought about by methods that 'offend a sense of justice.' "85
C. A Regulatory View of Substantive Due Process
The majority identified no protected liberty interest, based on the
Nebraska Constitution or state statute, because of the discretionary
nature of the pardons process. 8 6 Additionally, the court rejected the
idea that the substantive right flows from the constitution itself, be-
cause no fundamental right has been violated.
In contrast, the dissent adhered to a view of due process which, as
the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Daniels v. Williams,8 7 recognizes a
substantive component of due process which bars "certain government
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them [and which] serves to prevent governmental power from being
'used for purposes of oppression.' "88 This regulatory perspective of a
government's conduct toward its citizens finds its strength in the no-
tion that government cannot act arbitrarily,8 9 and defines liberty
broadly to include the right to be free from arbitrary governmental
83. 113 S. Ct. 853, 866-69 (1993).
84. In referring to Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), the dissent noted that
"[b]y relying on the existence of executive clemency to justify excluding certain
kinds of claims from judicial scrutiny, the Court recognized that clemency proce-
dures are an important last step in the descent to execution." Otey v. Stenberg,
34 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1994)(Gibson, J., dissenting).
85. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173
(1965)).
86. Like the clemency statute at issue in Dumschat, the Nebraska clemency
statute also is standardless. Otey had no state-created right other than
the right to ask for mercy. As in Dumschat, this does not create a pro-
tectable interest in clemency. It also does not create a protectable inter-
est in the manner in which the Board receives his request or in having
unbiased decisionmakers on the Board.
Id. at 637.
87. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
88. Id. at 331 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1855)).
89. See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. Rsv.
1044, 1099-1100 (1984)(arguing that it makes sense "to place limits on the gov-
ernment's behavior toward individuals . .. apart from any independent rights
those individuals may possess.").
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activity. This perspective was recently voiced by Justice O'Connor in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.90
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of the States at the time
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the
substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects....
'The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points
pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press,
and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints ... and which also recognizes ... that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment."9 1
In order to determine all that is contained within this broad notion
of liberty, one must look to the past and identify those fundamental
rights and immunities that are grounded in this society's history and
tradition.92 This view that due process is not bounded by any specifi-
cally delineated rights is perhaps best explained by Justice Frank-
furter in Rochin v. California.93
Regard for.., the Due Process Clause inescapably imposes upon this Court
an exercise ofjudgment upon the whole course of the proceedings... in order
to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses. These standards of justice are not
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were specifics. Due pro-
cess of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those per-
sonal immunities which.., are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
9 4
This regulatory view of substantive due process relies to some de-
gree on the visceral reaction of a large cross-section of society. In
other words, in addition to looking to judicial precedent, courts are
most likely to find a violation of substantive due process when "gov-
ernment... has behaved in a way that can be shown to be wrongful by
relatively direct argumentative appeal to some moral intuition or rela-
tively determinate principle that it believes to be widely shared and,
90. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
91. Id. at 2805 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)(Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
92. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In defining substantive due
process, Justice Scalia stated:
[WMe have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as "liberty"
be "fundamental".. . but also that it be an interest traditionally pro-
tected by our society. As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords
only these protections "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Id. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
93. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
94. Id. at 169 (quotations omitted).
19941
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
preferably, rooted in history."95 Thus, certain acts of the government
can be found to violate substantive due process if the court finds the
governmental conduct to be "conscience shocking" behavior.96
In Otey v. Stenberg, the majority opinion states that the issue of
whether "substantive due process provides a right to be free from arbi-
trary and capricious state action" has yet to be decided.97 However, in
Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul,9 8 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
did recognize such a view of substantive due process. In Condor, the
court defined arbitrary and capricious government activity which vio-
lates substantive due process as being activity "so 'egregious' and 'ir-
rational' that the action exceeds standards of inadvertence and mere
errors of law."99 Thus, under this view, the question becomes whether
the specific scheme of the Nebraska Board of Pardons-with the At-
torney General acting as a decisionmaker as well as assisting in or-
ganizing his staff's case against the applicant-rises to the level of
egregious or irrational governmental activity and runs contrary to a
moral intuition which is widely shared by society and rooted in
history.
D. Dual Role of Prosecutor and Arbiter
The vesting of clemency power in the executive branch, and the
discretionary use of the pardoning power by the executive, is a tradi-
tion which was adopted by the colonists for this nation's federal sys-
tem and has survived hundreds of years. Thus, this aspect of the
clemency process can hardly be challenged on grounds that it offends
historical and time-honored beliefs regarding fairness. However, the
Nebraska clemency process can be challenged on the basis that any
forum where an individual is required to present his case to a judge
who has a vested interest in the outcome of the hearing, and in fact
has guided the development of materials to be used in the
prosecutorial aspect of the hearing, is contrary to this society's notion
of fairness and legitimate conduct of government officials.
1. Attorney General's Conduct
The Attorney General necessarily has a partisan view of crime in
general, and of Otey's conviction and death sentence specifically. By
statute, the role of the Attorney General is to advise county attorneys
on criminal matters and to prosecute criminal proceedings, to their
95. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 320 (1993).
96. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
97. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1994)(quoting Hall v. Lombardi, 996
F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1993)).
98. 912 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1990).
99. Id. at 220.
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fullest, in the Nebraska Supreme Court.100 Undoubtedly, the state
recognized the Attorney General's partisan character when he was in-
cluded as a member of the Board of Pardons. Arguably, the state
wished to have an individual familiar with the judicial process avail-
able to advise the other board members when pardons applications
were being considered. The Board has functioned in this manner
since 1969, and no legal challenges have been raised until Otey. How-
ever, in Otey's hearing, the Attorney General's conduct can legiti-
mately be challenged as egregious, irrational, and contrary to deeply
held moral beliefs because of the cumulative effects of three factors: (1)
the unprecedented involvement of the Attorney General's staff in the
commutation hearing; (2) the Attorney General's involvement in pre-
paring his staff's presentation in opposition to Otey's pardons applica-
tion, and (3) the Attorney General's vigorous prosecution of the death
sentence in Otey's case.
a. Unprecedented Involvement of Attorney General's Staff at
the Board of Pardons Hearing
The appearance of two Assistant Attorney Generals at the Pardons
Board hearing-to oppose Otey's application and to testify as wit-
nesses-was unprecedented. Never before in the seventy-one year
history of the Attorney General's membership on the Board of Pardons
had the Attorney General's staff formally made an appearance at the
proceeding, or testified as witnesses.1O' Nor had any member of the
100. NEB. Ray STAT. § 84-205 (Cum. Supp. 1992) provides:
The duties of the Attorney General shall be:
(2) To consult with and advise the county attorneys, when requested by
them, in all criminal matters ....
(9) To appear for the state and prosecute and defend all civil or criminal
actions and proceedings in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court in which
the state is interested or a party.
101. Judge Urbom documented the unprecedented nature of the Attorney General's
involvement.
The evidence is that the Attorney General occupies the status of counsel
for the State of Nebraska by operation of the Constitution and statutes
and appeared at each hearing or proceeding before the Board of Pardons
from 1920 to the present concerning applications for commutation of
sentences of death, except for Timothy Iron Bear and perhaps Frank
Carter and Hugh Griffith, whose records are incomplete. There has been
discovered no record indicating that a deputy or Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral formally entered an appearance at any Board of Pardons proceeding
concerning an application for commutation of a death sentence prior to
the [Otey's] hearing .... There is no record that any Attorney General
or Assistant Attorney General ever testified as a witness prior to
[Otey's]. Although some records are incomplete, there has been discov-
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Pardons Board ever advocated grant or denial of an application.10 2
Indeed, it was the Attorney General who directed his assistants to ap-
pear at the Board of Pardons hearing and oppose Otey's applica-
tion.103 Further, the Attorney General contacted his assistant prior to
the hearing and was "informed of the general tenor" of the presenta-
tion to be given to the Board, "including a factual portrait of the crime
for which Otey had been convicted.1o4 The appearance of the Assis-
tant Attorney Generals at the hearing transformed the procedure
from an informal hearing into an adversarial hearing. 05 In fact, the
Assistant Attorney General notified the Attorney General prior to the
hearing that the presentation she would give to the board would be
adversarial in nature. 0 6 Additionally, when she appeared before the
board the Assistant Attorney General repeatedly compared her role at
the hearing to her role at the sentencing phase of the trial, which was
clearly an adversarial setting. 0 7
b. Attorney General's Involvement with His Staff's
Opposition to Otey's Application for Commutation
In briefs to the Nebraska Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Otey documented the depth of the Attorney Gen-
eral's personal involvement in opposing Otey's commutation. This in-
volvement was not addressed by the federal court of appeals in its
decision granting summary judgment. The Attorney General met
with his assistants one day prior to the hearing. At that time he re-
viewed the case and recommended that the presentation emphasize a
psychological report which was helpful to their case.' 08 Additionally,
there was testimony in the state district court that the attorney gen-
eral's staff spoke in advance with a corrections officer who was sched-
ered no record indicating that any Pardon Board member ever advocated
grant or denial of an application of commutation on behalf of the State.
Otey v. Hopkins, 4:CV92-3239 at 8-9 (D. Neb. Dec. 31, 1992)(Order granting sum-
mary judgment on equal protection claim). See also Otey v. Hopkins, 4:CV92-
3239 at 4 (D. Neb. Sept. 28, 1992)(order granting summary judgment on due pro-
cess claim)(citing affidavit of Allen J. Beermann, Exhibit 4, dated July 10, 1991).
102. Otey v. Hopkins, 4:CV92-3239 at 8-9 (D. Neb. Dec. 31, 1992)(Order granting sum-
mary judgment on equal protection claim). See also Otey v. Hopkins, 4:GV92-
3239 at 4 (D. Neb. Sept. 28, 1992)(order granting summary judgment on due pro-
cess claim)(citing affidavit of Allen J. Beermann, Exhibit 4, dated July 10, 1991).
103. Otey v. Hopkins, 4:CV92-3239 at 5 (D. Neb. Sept. 28, 1992)(order granting sum-
mary judgment on due process claim).
104. Id.
105. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974)(observing that the insertion of
counsel at a prison disciplinary proceeding would inevitably create a more adver-
sarial hearing).
106. Brief for Appellant at 6, Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1993).
107. Brief for Appellee and Brief on Cross-Appeal at 24-25, Otey v. State, 240 Neb.
813, 485 N.W.2d 153 (1992)(No. 91-0762).
108. Brief for Appellant at 6, Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1993).
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uled to testify on behalf of Otey at the hearing.10 9 The officer was
instructed not to offer any personal opinions at the commutation hear-
ing.1 1O The Attorney General was notified by his staff that the officer
would testify on Otey's behalf."' After the corrections officer spoke at
the hearing, he was "cross-examined" by the Attorney General who
produced letters from three former guards who were highly critical of
Otey.ii 2 Otey argued before the Nebraska Supreme Court that the
Attorney General was advised by his assistant of the nature of the
corrections officers testimony in advance, and thus was able to neu-
tralize his testimony by having conflicting testimony available in the
form of letters from other corrections officers.113
c. Attorney General's Vigorous Prosecution of the Death
Sentence for Otey
The Attorney General was highly involved in pursuing the death
penalty in Otey's case, both before and after the Board of Pardons
hearing. In a meeting prior to the hearing in which the parties gath-
ered to discuss the procedure to take place during Otey's hearing, the
Attorney General reflected on his heavy involvement in the case and
his level of frustration.
I share very much your frustration with the system that goes on almost end-
lessly.... I have spent a rather considerable amount of my time working on
this case the last few weeks with my staff successfully opposing stays of execu-
tion in both the Nebraska Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court. I believe that this should be handled as expeditiously as the Board
may properly do. I am very familiar with the facts of the case, having been
involved in preparing those legal proceedings that have been handled during
the past year.
1 14
In addition, the Attorney General was listed as the attorney of record
for the state on the briefs presented to the federal court of appeals.i"5
In sum, the Attorney General transformed the Board of Pardon
hearing into an adversarial setting when he took the unprecedented
step of instructing his staff to appear to oppose Otey's application. He
then crossed the line between arbiter and prosecutor when he partici-
pated in the planning of his staff's case against Otey. Moreover, the
Attorney General admitted his bias against Otey's receiving a commu-
109. Brief for Appellee and Brief on Cross-Appeal at 26, Otey v. State, 240 Neb. 813,
485 N.W.2d 153 (1992)(No. 91-0762).
110. Id.
111. Brief for Appellant at 6, Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1993).
112. Brief for Appellee and Brief on Cross-Appeal at 27, Otey v. State, 240 Neb. 813,
485 N.W.2d 153 (1992XNo. 91-0762).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 16.
115. "[E]very pleading submitted by the state in Otey's case, including the briefs sub-
mitted to this court, list the attorney general as the counsel of record." Otey v.
Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125, 1134 (8th Cir. 1993XGibson, J., dissenting).
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tation of his death sentence, which stemmed from the numerous court
battles in which he sought Otey's death and fought Otey's stays of exe-
cution. The combination of these actions by the Attorney General ren-
dered the Pardons Board hearing fundamentally unfair and contrary
to commonly shared notions of justice.
2. Case Law Addressing Dual Role of Prosecutor and Judge
Cases throughout the history of the United States have sounded
the principle that one who serves as both prosecutor and judge offends
longstanding notions of fairness. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. McGrath,116 Justice Frankfurter noted that fairness is at the
heart of a democratic government, 117 and one of the three principles of
natural justice is that "a man may not be a judge in his own cause."'1 8
In McGrath, the court found the Attorney General's tactic of compiling
a list of persons suspected of communist activity violated substantive
due process. In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter elaborated on
the expansiveness of the Due Process Clause and its constraints on
executive branch members:
The Attorney General is certainly not immune from the historic requirements
of fairness merely because he acts, however conscientiously, in the name of
security. Nor does he obtain immunity on the ground that designation is not
an "adjudication" or a "regulation" in the conventional use of those terms.
Due process is not confined in its scope to the particular forms in which rights
have heretofore been found to have been curtailed for want of procedural fair-
ness. Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitu-
tional system. While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past in assuring
fundamental justice, it is also a living principle not confined to past
instances.
1 1 9
The Court restated the rule that a fair tribunal requires a division
between the roles of prosecutor and judge in In re Murchison.120
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of
course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.
To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be
defined with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be
considered.
12 1
In Murchison, the Court held that it violated due process for a judge to
try an individual whom he had previously charged with contempt,
when the judge was acting in the role of a one-man grand jury. The
Court expressed concern over the fact that the judge, having once been
116. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
117. Id. at 170 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 170 n.17 (quoting Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers, Cmd. 4060, at
75-80).
119. Id. at 173-74 (emphasis added).
120. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
121. Id. at 136.
[Vol. 73:483
NEBRASKA BOARD OF PARDONS
the accuser, could not fairly play the role of adjudicator. The court
stated that:
having been a part of [the indictment] process, a judge cannot be... wholly
disinterested in the [outcome]. While he would not likely have all the zeal of a
prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would have none of that zeal.
Fair trials are too important a part of our free society to let prosecuting judges
be trial judges of the charges they prefer.122
Courts have repeatedly upheld the notion that the functions of
prosecutor and adjudicator should not be combined. In Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath,123 the Court concluded that it was unfair to com-
mingle the functions of prosecutor and decisionmaker in a deportation
proceeding, indicating that to hold otherwise might bring the proce-
dure "into constitutional jeopardy."'124 This rule also has been applied
in the executive decisionmaking setting. In Hoberman v. Lock Haven
Hospital,125 the court held that a physician who filed charges with the
medical executive committee against one of his peers, presented evi-
dence to the committee, and participated in the discussion and the
findings of the committee, violated the rule set forth in Murchison that
one cannot serve as prosecutor and judge.
The foregoing cases demonstrate the firmly held belief expressed
by the United States Supreme Court that one cannot prosecute and
adjudicate the same case. Judges or adjudicating board members who
have been involved in the investigation or prosecution of a particular
case, who have a personal interest in the case, or who appear biased,
should not take part in adjudicating the case.
Like the judge in Murchison, it cannot be said that Attorney Gen-
eral Stenberg had none of the zeal of a prosecutor, when he considered
Otey's request for life. His zeal was clearly evidenced when he di-
rected his staff to appear at the hearing and oppose Otey's pardon, and
when he participated in planning that presentation. It was further
evidenced by the Attorney General's own public statements expres-
sing his frustration with the system that allowed Otey to continually
evade execution. When the Attorney General altered the nature of the
Board of Pardons from an informal hearing to an adversarial hearing
by ordering his staff to appear and present evidence, and when he as-
sisted in the preparation of that presentation, he unlawfully combined
the roles of arbiter and advocate in violation of the rule of natural
justice voiced in McGrath.
In Malek v. Camp,126 the Eighth Circuit recognized the need for
adjudicatory boards to remain free from bias. In Malek the court
122. Id. at 137.
123. 339 U.S. 33, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
124. Id. at 50.
125. 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
126. 822 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1987).
1994]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
noted that to successfully allege bias in violation of due process a
party must show the adjudicator had a direct, personal, and substan-
tial interest adverse to the party claiming bias.127 The court in Malek
saw potential bias where a member of the prison disciplinary board
had recently been named as an adverse party in a suit filed by the
prisoner who was to appear before the board. The court stressed the
need to weigh each situation of alleged bias on a case by case basis,
focusing on each party's involvement in the previous litigation.12s
The appellate court reversed the lower courts dismissal of the civil
rights claim and remanded the case to the district court to determine
if the level of involvement of the parties in the prior civil case was
sufficient to render the chairman of the disciplinary board personally
biased against the inmate.129
According to the standard set forth in Malek, the Nebraska Attor-
ney General may have a direct, personal, and substantial bias which
precludes him from acting as an impartial arbitrator in Otey's par-
don's board hearing. As the court in Malek indicated, such situations
must be reviewed individually with an examination of each party's in-
volvement in the previous litigation. The fact that the Attorney Gen-
eral acted as an adverse party to Otey in the sentencing phase of the
trial, and that he has publicly admitted his prejudice which has re-
sulted from his previous prosecutions, are facts the courts must con-
sider in determining whether the alleged bias is substantial enough to
indicate a violation of due process.
Administrative agencies, which combine investigatory and adjudi-
catory functions, present an interesting challenge to the rule that one
cannot act as prosecutor andjudge. In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,130 the
Court held that the same standards of neutrality that apply to judges
do not necessarily apply to administrative prosecutors assessing fines
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.1'3 Key factors influ-
encing the Court's decision were that the assistant regional adminis-
trator's role was much more that of a prosecutor than a judge,132 and
that the employer who is assessed a fine by the assistant administra-
tor has a statutory right to a de novo hearing before an administrative
law judge.133
127. Id. at 816.
128. Id. at 816-17.
129. Id. at 817.
130. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
131. Id. at 248.
132. Id. at 247. The Court noted that the assistant administrator performed no judi-
cial or quasi-judicial functions. Id.
133. "In that hearing, the assistant regional administrator acts as the complaining
party and bears the burden of proof on contested issues." Id.
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In Withrow v. Larkin,134 the Court held that the combining of the
adjudicative and investigative functions is not generally found to be a
denial of due process. 135 In Withrow, the Court determined that one
who attempts to claim bias on the part of an administrative agency
based merely on the combination of the investigatory and adjudicative
functions:
must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psycho-
logical tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudi-
cative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due pro-
cess is to be adequately implemented. 13 6
Thus, the Court established a higher standard for proving that a deci-
sionmaker on an administrative board is biased. The claimant must
overcome a presumption of integrity on the part of the decisionmaker
and establish that the risk of actual bias is too great, based on psycho-
logical tendencies and human weaknesses.
The Board of Pardons hearing is distinguishable from an adminis-
trative hearing, and thus the higher standard the Court established
for proving bias on the part of administrative adjudicators is not appli-
cable. However, even if this higher standard were to apply, the Attor-
ney General's actions in this hearing meet that higher standard.
Specifically, the Attorney General's acts of organizing his staff's ap-
pearance at the hearing in opposition to Otey's application, assisting
in determining which evidence should be presented, and admitting
publicly his extensive involvement in pursuing Otey's expeditious exe-
cution are sufficient to demonstrate that the risk of bias on the part of
the Attorney General is too great, "under a realistic appraisal of psy-
134. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
135. Id. at 47.
136. Id. The Court noted, however, that the issue of bias in agencies where the adjudi-
cative and investigatory functions are combined can be problematic.
That is not to say that there is nothing to the argument that those who
have investigated should not then adjudicate. The issue is substantial,
it is not new, and legislators and others concerned with the operations of
administrative agencies have given much attention to whether and to
what extent distinctive administrative functions should be performed by
the same persons. No single answer has been reached. Indeed, the
growth, variety, and complexity of the administrative processes have
made any one solution highly unlikely. Within the Federal Government
itself, Congress has addressed the issue in several different ways, pro-
viding for varying degrees of separation from complete separation of
functions to virtually none at all.
Id. at 51-52. The Court further noted that generally the guidelines found in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) are followed. Id. at 52. The Act
provides that "no employee engaged in investigating or prosecuting may also par-
ticipate or advise in the adjudicating function." Id. However, agencies and their
members are exempted from this prohibition. Id.
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chological tendencies and human weakness,"13 7 to allow him to adju-
dicate the issue of whether Otey should avoid execution.
The Board of Pardons hearing can be distinguished from an admin-
istrative hearing in that there is no opportunity for judicial review of
the board's decision. In Marshall, the employer who was assessed a
fine by the administrative board had the opportunity of de novo review
by an administrative law judge.138 Thus, any unacceptable bias on
the part of the investigator/penalty assessor could be addressed at
that time. However, as demonstrated by Otey, Schick, and Smith,
courts are extremely hesitant to review pardons board decisions.
Additionally, the Pardons Board hearing is distinguishable from
the administrative hearings cases because the role the Attorney Gen-
eral played prior to, and at the hearing, is more than a combination of
investigatory and adjudicatory functions. The Attorney General was
not conducting an investigation of Otey's crime when he pursued the
death sentence before the three-judge panel, nor when he fought the
numerous stays of execution sought by Otey. His pursuit of justice in
the courtroom went far beyond mere investigation. The Attorney Gen-
eral was acting as a prosecutor in the fullest sense. He continued in
this role when he previewed his staff's presentation prior to the Par-
dons Board hearing, and offered input as to the content of the hearing.
Yet, the Attorney General was also responsible to act as an executive
arbiter of Otey's request for a pardon. This duality of roles is imper-
missible under the standards set forth by the Court.
Justice Holmes stated that pardons are a "part of the Constitu-
tional scheme" which are granted when it is determined "by the ulti-
mate authority that the public welfare will be better served by
inflicting less than what the judgment fixed."139 The very structure of
the Board of Pardons raises the issue of institutional bias, when the
party who is responsible for pursuing court room justice is also respon-
sible for determining if the public welfare is better served if the court's
judgment is superseded. But, if this is the extent of the bias, it may
still be within acceptable bounds. When the Attorney General abdi-
cates his role of executive arbiter, however, and molds the hearing so
that it becomes a replay of the adversarial, judicial proceedings, the
very purpose of the clemency function has been frustrated.
Moreover, once the hearing is elevated from informal to adver-
sarial in nature, rules of fundamental fairness require that the func-
tions of prosecutor and adjudicator remain separate. However, this
was not the case in Otey's hearing. The Attorney General contributed
to his staff's opposition to Otey's request for a commutation by helping
them plan the evidence to present which would most convincingly
137. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
138. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 247 (1980).
139. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
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demonstrate to the Pardons Board that Otey deserved to die. He im-
permissibly combined the role of adjudicator and prosecutor in viola-
tion of long-standing principles set forth by the United States
Supreme Court.
Society's conscience is not shocked by the traditional role of the
executive having the discretion to review pardons request and to de-
termine if the public welfare will be best served by granting a commu-
tation. Society's notion of fairness is shocked when an informal
executive hearing is elevated to an adversarial hearing, and a man
must plead for his life before a board where the prosecutor is the
judge.
3. Ethics and Professional Responsibility Opinions
An examination of ethics opinions from the American Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility further
demonstrates that the Attorney General's role in the Pardons Board
hearing not only violates canons of legal ethics but also offends soci-
ety's sentiments of justice. In Formal Opinion No. 110,140 the Com-
mittee discussed a situation in which a municipal judge, who
continued in private practice, represented a woman in her action to
compel alimony payment by her husband. The judge also presided
over the criminal non-support claim against his client's husband. The
Committee found this to be an unacceptable combination of roles and
cited Oakley v. Aspinwall141 as establishing a principle of judicial pro-
priety that is uniformly recognized:
The first idea in the administration of justice is that a judge must necessarily
be free from all bias and partiality. He can not be both judge and party, arbi-
ter and advocate in the same cause. Mankind are so agreed in this principle,
that any departure from it shocks their common sense and sentiment of
justice.
14 2
Thus, the ABA found a party's service as both arbiter and advocate
both unethical and shocking to society's notions of justice.
A second principle set forth in the opinions is that an attorney
should not represent conflicting interests without obtaining the cli-
ents' consent. Canon six of the Canons of Professional Ethics stated
that "[i]t is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned, given after a full disclosure of the
facts."'143 This principle was carried on into the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which is followed in Nebraska.144 The Attorney
140. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 110 (1934).
141. 3 N.Y. 547 (1850).
142. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 110 (1934).
143. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs Canon 6 (1906).
144. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSioNAL REsPONSmmrrv EC 5-14, EC 5-15, EC 5-16
(1994) ("[B]efore a lawyer may represent multiple clients, he should explain fully
to each client the implications of the common representation and should accept or
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General, as he acted on the Board of Pardons, represented two con-
flicting interests. First, the Attorney General represented the public's
interest in seeing justice-as determined by the court system-car-
ried out. Second, the Attorney General represented the public's com-
peting interest in providing a system of executive clemency which acts
as a "fail-safe"'45 to the criminal justice system. The Attorney Gen-
eral cannot obtain the consent of his clients, because in both instances,
his client is the public and "[n]o question of consent can be involved as
the public... cannot consent."'146 Although these two roles necessar-
ily conflict to some degree, the bias may be minimized if the Attorney
General acts only within the appropriate role in the appropriate situa-
tion-when arguing for the death sentence he acts as prosecutor;
when acting as adjudicator he listens to the request for mercy and, as
objectively as possible, considers it. However, when the Attorney Gen-
eral acts in a prosecutorial role, when the setting calls for conduct be-
fitting an executive arbitrator, problems arise. He is thwarting the
public's desire to have a final executive consideration of the sentence,
which considers factors beyond the reach of the courts. He is playing
the role of prosecutor at the expense of his duty to act as executive
arbiter.
A third principle recognized by the Committee is the inability of an
attorney to act objectively when he has zealously pursued one side of a
case. In Formal Opinion 136 the Committee determined that an attor-
ney who had repeatedly appeared before the state pardons board on
behalf of a man convicted of murder, and who was later elected to the
office of county attorney, could not continue to appear on the appli-
cant's behalf at subsequent pardons board hearings.147 The Commit-
tee noted that it would not be an appropriate role for a county attorney
to be working to undo the labors of the state. In this opinion, the Com-
mittee also recognized the natural tendency for an attorney who has
fought for a specific outcome to be biased and only able to see one side
of the controversy.
It is stated that the county attorney regards the conviction as a flagrant
miscarriage of justice. This is a natural view for the attorney to entertain
after several times representing the convict. He has so long thought only of
continue employment only if the clients consent."). Additionally, Canon five
requires:
Except with the consent of his client and after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment
on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own
financial, business, property, or personal interests.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmrrY DR 5-101A (1994).
145. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868 (1993).
146. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 16 (1929).
147. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 136 (1935).
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the convict's interest and has been so long unconsciously identified with it
that he is measurably incapacitated to see that there is any other side.148
Fourth, the Ethics Committee recognized that an attorney for the
state will necessarily be opposed to a convicted criminal's application
for a pardon.149 According to the Committee, "[t]he application for a
pardon or parole appears to be a proceeding in which the state is inter-
ested adversely to the convict."150 Thus, according to this principle, it
is virtually impossible for a state attorney, or specifically the Attorney
General to be an objective arbiter in a pardons hearing, for his orien-
tation is necessarily to oppose the pardon.
Finally, the Committee- made an observation about the nature of a
pardons board. "It must be assumed that the board before which the
county attorney had several times appeared is impartial."151
A few key concepts stand out from these opinions which are rele-
vant to Otey and the alleged substantive due process violation. First,
the notion of one serving as arbiter in a case where that same person
is prosecutor offends common sense and sentiments of justice. This
notion closely follows the opinion in McGrath. Second, it is unprofes-
sional for an attorney to represent conflicting interests without gain-
ing the consent of the parties; and consent cannot be obtained when
one of the parties is the public because the public cannot consent.
Third, the opinions recognize the necessarily partisan view of the
state attorney in opposing pardons applications. Fourth, a Pardons
Board is assumed to be impartial. Finally, the Committee recognized
that one who toils zealously for a cause is unable to see that issue
objectively.
Each of the foregoing ethical principles was breached when Otey
appeared before the Pardons Board. The Board was not impartial, for
the very reason that the Attorney General-who "has so long thought
only of the convict's [execution] and has been so long unconsciously
identified with it that he was measurably incapacitated to see that
there is any other side,"152-was then allowed to adjudicate the issue
of whether his own prosecutorial endeavors should be negated by al-
lowing Otey to escape execution. The Attorney General was repre-
senting two conflicting parties-the public in its desire to see court
room justice carried out, and the public in its desire to have an execu-
148. Id.
149. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 118 (1934)(rul-
ing that a county attorney who is responsible for prosecuting crimes should not
appear before the board of pardons or parole in another county to testify on behalf
of the individual convicted of a crime because the state is necessarily interested
adversely to the convict).
150. Id.
151. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 136 (1935).
152. Id.
1994]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tive "fail safe"'5 3 to court room justice. The Attorney General not only
acted unethically when he acted as prosecutor and judge in Otey's par-
dons board hearing, but his participation "shocks [mankind's] common
sense and sentiment of justice."'54
V. CONCLUSION
Unfettered discretion in the clemency process is a historical tradi-
tion which, of itself, does not offend society's deeply held beliefs re-
garding justice and fairness.i55 However, a historical analysis of case
law and ABA ethics opinions demonstrates that the fusing of the roles
of prosecutor and judge violates society's long-standing notions of fun-
damental fairness.' 5 6 Otey's hearing before the Nebraska Board of
Pardons presented a confrontation between these two traditional prin-
ciples. The question arises, at what point must the executive discre-
tion traditionally allowed in clemency proceedings give way to the
fundamental principle that "a man may not be a judge of his own
cause."157
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the only limit to
the executive clemency power is that it must be exercised in a consti-
tutionally-unobjectionable manner.158 Under a substantive due pro-
cess analysis, fundamental rights that have historically and
traditionally been protected by this society are incorporated into the
Due Process Clause.' 5 9 The right to be free from government activity
where one's prosecutor is also one's judge, is one of these time-honored
fundamental rights embodied in the concept of due process.
Accordingly, at the point where executive clemency involves an im-
permissible commingling of the roles of prosecutor and judge, it be-
comes constitutionally infirmed. Such was the case when Otey
appeared before the Nebraska Board of Pardons. The Attorney Gen-
eral's inability to set aside his role of prosecutor and act as an impar-
tial arbiter at Otey's hearing violated traditional notions of
fundamental fairness and caused that clemency hearing to fall outside
the broad terrain of constitutionally-acceptable discretion.
Sheree Strom Carson '95
153. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868 (1993).
154. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 110 (1934)(quot-
ing Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N.Y. 547, 550 (1850).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 11-25.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 116-154.
157. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 n.17 (1951)
(quoting Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers, Cmd. 4060, at 75-80).
158. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (discussing federal clemency power).
159. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
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